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Abstract
In decision theory an act is a function from a set of conditions to
the set of real numbers. The set of conditions is a partition in some
algebra of events. The expected value of an act can be calculated when
a probability measure is given. We adopt an algebraic point of view by
substituting the algebra of events with a finite distributive lattice and
the probability measure with a lattice valuation. We introduce a partial
order on acts that generalizes the dominance relation and show that the
set of acts is a lattice with respect to this order. Finally we analyze some
different kinds of comparison between acts, without supposing a common
set of conditions for the acts to be compared.
Keywords: Decision theory, lattice theory, partitions, Allais paradox.
1 Classical acts
The concept of an act is at the basis of decision theory, in fact decision making
under risk can be reduced to the choice among different acts on the basis of their
expected value. Loosely speaking, we can say that an act is a function from a
set of conditions to a set of consequences. In this paragraph we introduce the
intuitive framework for decisions, grounded on the concept of probability space,
but in the following paragraphs we shall adopt a more algebraic point of view,
based on the concept of valued lattice.
The consequence of an act can be any kind of thing, but we confine ourselves
to elements of R, the set of real numbers. We only observe that in an economical
framework real numbers can represent any definite amount of goods, money
and so on, but in a psychological framework they may also represent degrees of
satisfaction, subjective feelings of pain and pleasure and so on.
The conditions of an act are events from a probability space. A probability
space is a triple (S, CS , p) where S is a sample space, CS a field of sets over S
and p : CS → [0, 1] a function satisfying Kolmogoroff’s axioms: 1) p(A) = 1, 2)
p(X ∪ Y ) = p(X) + p(Y ), when X ∩ Y = ∅. In this way probability is seen as
the measure of an event represented by a set. In the following we shall limit
ourselves to finite sample spaces, so the algebra of events CS will coincide with
P(S), the Boolean algebra of all subsets of S. The conditions of an act must
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satisfy a fundamental property: they must be a partition of S. We say that
a subset E of P (S) is a partition of S when the following three conditions are
satisfied:
1.
⋃
E = S,
2. e2 ∩ e2 = ∅, for all e2, e2 ∈ E with e2 6= e2,
3. e 6= ∅, for all e ∈ E.
One of the possible partitions is given by the set of all atoms in P(S), i.e the
set of all singletons {s} with s ∈ S.
Now we can define an act on E as a function α : E → R, where E is a
partition of S. We denote with A(E) the set of all acts on E. The elements of
α[E], the range of α, are the consequences (rewards, payoffs) of α: intuitively,
α(e) is the consequence of α when the event e happens. The choice of a partition
as the domain of an act reflects a relevant aspect of real life acts, where we are
confronted with a set of alternative and exclusive conditions, represented by
events e1, ..., en, leading to consequences α(e1), ..., α(en). This amounts to say
that the domain {e1, ..., en} of an act is a partition of S. For every state of
the world, for every experimental outcome, one and only one event ei of the
partition E takes place leading to a single consequence α(ei).
A central problem of decision theory is to define a preference relation on the
set of acts. When α, β ∈ A(E), β is obviously preferred to α when it gives a
better or equal reward for all conditions and in this case we say that β dominates
α. So we define α E β, iff α(e) ≤ β(e) for all e ∈ E. The relation E is a
partial order on A(E), but not every pair of acts on A(E) can be compared in
E, so it is not complete. If α ∈ A(E) and β ∈ A(D), where E and D are
different sets of conditions, the relation of dominance is not defined.
When we choose a dominant act, we ignore all questions about the probabil-
ity of the relevant conditions, the elements of E involved in the decision process.
So we define another preference relation that takes in account the probability
of events/conditions. Given a probability measure p : P(S) → [0, 1], we define
the expected value of α with respect to p setting
exp(α, p) =
∑
{α(e)p(e) : e ∈ E}
and we define α exp β iff exp(α, p) ≤ exp(β, p). The relation exp is reflexive,
transitive and complete, i.e. is a total preorder. (exp is not antisymmetric,
so it is not a partial order.) The choice among different acts, with respect to
a given probability measure, is accomplished by ranking acts by their expected
value: this is the most important rule of choice in the field of decision under
risk. In general, we observe that we may have exp(α, p) ≤ exp(β, p) even if
α(x) ≤ β(x) holds in a single case (α(x) ≤ β(x) if x = e and α(x) > β(x)
if x 6= e), because the relevance of the single condition x ∈ E in establishing
α exp β depends on its probability value p(x). A huge value p(e) may rule out
all other conditions x ∈ E. Some critical remarks against the ranking of acts
2
based on expected utility are due to Allais and Ellsberg, in [1] and [5]. A way
out to Allais Paradox is sketched in Appendix B, where the notion of intrinsic
expected value is introduced as the ratio between the expected value of α and
the total sum of all possible rewards of α.
The comparison of acts with respect to expected utility is generally confined
to acts on the same set of conditions. This is clear when the representation of
decisions is based on decision matrices. (See, for instance, [6].) We underline,
however, that every couple of acts α : E → R and β : D → R can be compared
in exp, as far as the conditions E and D are partitions of the same algebra of
events. In this way we can rely on a common probability measure p and so we can
compute the expected value of α and β with respect to p. From the point of view
of expected value, the ranking of α and β is reduced to the comparison of two
real numbers exp(α, p) and exp(β, p), leaving out every consideration regarding
the very nature of the events/conditions involved in the decision process, even
if the result may be somewhat unnatural. In this work we introduce a partial
order v in which acts based on different set of conditions can be compared, as
it happens with expected value. The comparison of acts in vis a generalization
of dominance, taking in account the partial order of the partitions involved (see
Appendix A) and the probability of the relevant conditions.
The plan of this work is the following. In the second paragraph we analyze
the connections between acts and lotteries or gambles. In the third paragraph
we adopt an algebraic standpoint: the algebra of events P(S), the Boolean
algebra of all subsets of S, is substituted by a finite distributive lattice A, the
set of conditions of an act becomes an algebraic partition of A and an act is a
function from such a partition to the set of real numbers. Then we introduce a
partial order v on acts and in the fourth paragraph we show that the set of
all acts on A is a lattice with respect to v. In the fifth paragraph we discuss
some different ways of comparing acts.
2 Acts and lotteries
The process of decision is often described in the literature as a choice between
lotteries or gambles: the relationships between acts and lotteries are sketched
in this paragraph. For all finite set X , we say that a function f : X → [0, 1] is a
distribution on X when
∑
{f(x) : x ∈ X} = 1. Given a finite set Z = {z1, ..., zn}
of real numbers, the outcomes or rewards, a lottery on Z is a distribution l :
Z → [0, 1]. The expected value of l is defined as follows:
Exp(l) =
∑
{zl(z) : z ∈ Z}.
The concepts of lottery and act are connected but not equivalent. To every
pair constituted by an act α : E → R and a probability measure p : P(S)→ [0, 1]
we can associate a lottery lα,p on α[E] with the same expected value, defined
as follows: for all x ∈ α[E], we set
lα,p(x) = p(
⋃
α−1(x)}).
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We show that lα,p is a lottery by verifying that lα,p is a distribution on α[E]. If
x ∈ α[E] then
lα,p(x) =
∑
{p(e) : e ∈ α−1(x)}
because the events in E belong to a partition and are pairwise disjoint. We have
∑
{lα,p(x) : x ∈ α[E]} =
∑
{
∑
{p(e) : e ∈ α−1(x)} : x ∈ α[E]}
=
∑
{p(e) : e ∈ E} = 1.
Now we prove that Exp(α, p) = Exp(lα,p). In fact,
Exp(α, p) =
∑
{α(e)p(e) : e ∈ E}
=
∑
{
∑
{α(e)p(e) : e ∈ a−1(x)} : x ∈ α[E]}
=
∑
{
∑
{xp(e) : e ∈ a−1(x)} : x ∈ α[E]}
=
∑
{x
∑
{p(e) : e ∈ a−1(x)} : x ∈ α[E]}
=
∑
{xlα,p(x) : x ∈ α[E]}
= Exp(lα,p).
In the other direction, we cannot immediately associate an act to a lottery,
because a lottery l is only a finite sequence (l(z1), ..., l(zn)) of probability values
adding to 1, without any reference to a sample space, an algebra of events and
a probability measure on this algebra. So, given a lottery l on Z, we must
supply a finite Boolean algebra P(S) and a partition E before defining the act
αl associated to l. If Z contains n rewards, we choose S = {s1..., sn}. Then
E = {{si} : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is a partition of S and we define an act αl : E → R
setting αl({si}) = zi. Finally, we define a probability measure p on P(S)
starting with p({si}) = l(zi): as every event can be expressed as a disjoint
union of singletons, we can extend p to the whole of P(S). Now we show that
exp(l) = exp(αl, p) where αl and p are defined as above:
exp(αl, p) =
∑
{αl({si})p({si}) : {si} ∈ E}
=
∑
{zil(zi) : zi ∈ Z}
= exp(l)
where the second line follows because there is a bijection between Z and E.
3 Acts in finite distributive lattices
The framework for acts introduced so far can be formulated in algebraic terms
as follows. Let A be a finite distributive lattice, we introduce an algebraic
counterpart of the set theoretic notion of partition as follows: we say that
E ⊆ A is an algebraic partition of A if
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1.
∨
E = 1,
2. e2 ∧ e2 = 0, for all e2, e2 ∈ E with e2 6= e2,
3. e 6= 0, for all e ∈ E.
We speak of a partition E of A (E on A) when an algebraic (set-theoretical)
partition is intended. We denote with Π(A) (Π(A)) the set of all algebraic (set-
theoretical) partitions of A(A). The aim of 3) is to avoid redundancies. On one
side, if E is a partition and 0 ∈ E, then E is redundant because E − {0} is a
partition too. On the other side, if E is a redundant partition and so, for some
e ∈ E, E − {e} is a partition too, then we can easily see that e = 0. In fact,
e = e∧
∨
(E−{e}) = 0. To make life easier we have collected some basic results
about partitions in Appendix A.
Given a partition E of A, an act on E is a function α : E → R. We
denote with A(E) the set of all acts on E. An act of A is an act α : E → R,
for some partition E of A. We denote with A(A) the set of all acts of A,
i.e.
⋃
{A(E) : E ∈ Π(A)}. It can be easily seen that the intuitive notion of
an act, as introduced in the first paragraph, is only a particular case of the
algebraic notion. Finally, the concept of a probability measure p on P(S) is to
be generalized to the concept of a valuation v on A, thus obtaining a valued
lattice (A, ν). To make our exposition self-contained, we introduce some basic
facts about valued lattices. (See [2] Chapter X.)
When A is a lattice we say that a function v : A→ R is a valuation on A if
v(a ∨ b) = v(a) + v(b)− v(a ∧ b). (∗)
If x ≤ y implies v(x) ≤ v(y), we say that v is isotone; v is strictly isotone if we
can substitute ≤ with <. (In [2] a strictly isotone valuation is called a positive
one.) In the following we will confine ourselves to non-negative valuations, i.e.
valuations such that 0 ≤ v(a), for all a ∈ A. A valued lattice is a pair (A, v)
where A is a lattice and v a valuation on A.
If A is a bounded lattice, we say that v is a bounded lattices valuation if v
is a valuation on A and v(0) = 0 and v(1) = 1. If v is an isotone valuation on a
bounded lattice A, then v[A] ⊆ [0, 1]. A valued bounded lattice is a pair (A, v)
where A is a bounded lattice and v a bounded lattices valuation on A.
If A is a Boolean algebra, we say that v is a Boolean valuation if v is a
bounded lattices valuation on A. A valued Boolean algebra is a pair (A, v),
where A is a Boolean algebra and v a Boolean valuation on A. We can give
an equivalent definition of a Boolean valuation as follows. In a lattice with
0, a function f : A → [0, 1] is said to be additive iff f(a ∨ b) = f(a) + f(b),
whenever a ∧ b = 0. It can be easily proved that, if A is a Boolean algebra and
v : A→ [0, 1], then v is a Boolean valuation iff v(1) = 1 and v is additive. So a
probability space (A, CA, p), where A is a finite sample space, CA a field of sets
on A and p a probability measure satisfying Kolmogoroff’s axioms with finite
additivity, is a particular case of valued Boolean algebra. It can be easily proved
that: if (A, v) is a Boolean valued algebra then v is isotone and v(¬a) = 1−v(a).
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As v is isotone, every Boolean valuation takes its values in [0, 1] (see [7], par.
2).
When A is a finite distributive lattice, E is a partition of A and v is an
isotone valuation on A, we can define the expected value of an act α : E → R
with respect to v setting
exp(α, v) =
∑
{α(e)v(e) : e ∈ E}.
When the valuation v is clear from the context, we simply write exp(α). We
underline that we confine ourselves to isotone valuations, so that ν(a) ∈ [0, 1]
for all a ∈ A. As in the preceding paragraph, acts can be ranked on the basis
of their expected value so we define, for all α and β in A(A), α exp β iff
exp(α, v) ≤ exp(β, v). The relation exp is reflexive, transitive and complete.
For acts having the same domain, it is natural to define an order pointwise.
Suppose α, β ∈ A(E), then we define α E β iff α(e) ≤ β(e), for all e ∈ E. In
this case, we say that β dominates α. It can be easily shown that A(E) is a
partial order with respect to E and in particular a lattice where, for all e ∈ E,
inf(α, β)(e) = min(α(e), β(e)) and sup(α, β)(e) = max(α(e), β(e)). We leave a
direct proof to the reader, but we observe that it is only a particular case of the
following proposition:
For all lattice B and all set E, the power BE, where the order relation is
defined pointwise, is a lattice. If B is distributive, bounded, complemented, so
is BE.
In fact, the axioms involved are equational and then are preserved by direct
products and powers (see, for instance, [3] par. 6.2). As real numbers with
their natural order are a lattice, so is A(E) when acts are ordered pointwise
(i.e. by dominance).
The preference relations E and expare inspired by different points of view.
In α E β acts are compared with respect to their conditions and this is possible
because α and β have E as a common domain. When we assert α E β we
know that the payoff of β is better or equal to the payoff of α for all conditions
e ∈ E. In the case of expected value, an overall valuation of the performances
of α and β is given by separately calculating the weighted average of payoffs
of each one of them, for all conditions. There is no need of a common set of
conditions E. But even if there is such an E , we don’t know whether the payoff
of β is better or equal to the payoff of α for all conditions e ∈ E, we know only
that it is so for some e and in particular for e with an high probability value.
Now we introduce a preference relationv on acts in A(A) that borrows from
E the comparison of conditions and from expthe reference to probabilities.
For all E,D ∈ Π(A), we say that E is a refinement of D, in symbols E ≤ B
when, for all e ∈ E, there is a de ∈ D such that e ≤ de . Such an element of D
is unique (see Appendix A, lemma 13) and this is why we denote it by de. If α,
β ∈ A(A), where α : E → R and β : D → R, and v is an isotone valuation on
A, we say that β is preferred to α with respect to ν, in symbols α v β, when
the following conditions are satisfied:
1. E ≤ B,
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2. for all e ∈ E, α(e) ≤ β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
.
As in the case of α E β, the performances of α and β are compared with
respect to the single conditions of the acts involved. As in the case of α exp β,
the comparison of α and β depends on v, i.e. on the probability values of the
relevant conditions. In fact, we cannot compare directly α(e) with β(de), as we
did with the relation of dominance, because e and de belong to different sets of
conditions, so we compare α(e) with β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
. As v(e)
v(de)
< 1, because e ≤ de
implies v(e) ≤ v(de), we compare α(e) with a reduced β(de). This reduction
can be justified as follows. The value β(d), for any d ∈ D, can be smeared on
the set Ed = {x ∈ E : x ≤ d} as the set {β(d)
v(x)
v(d) : x ∈ Ed}. In fact, we have
∑
{β(d)
v(x)
v(d)
: x ∈ Ed} =
β(d)
v(d)
∑
{v(x) : x ∈ Ed}
=
β(d)
v(d)
v(
∨
Ed)
=
β(d)
v(d)
v(d)
= β(d),
where the second line follows because x ∧ x′ = 0 for all x, x′ ∈ E and the third
line because
∨
Ed = d by theorem 17 of Appendix A. So we can compare α(e)
with β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
on E and this is just clause 2.
The following theorem shows that E is the restriction to A(E) of v defined
on A(A).
Theorem 1 For all α, β ∈ A(E), α v β iff α E β.
Proof. We have α v β iff, for all e ∈ E, α(e) ≤ β(ee)
v(e)
v(ee)
, where ee is
the only x ∈ E such that e ≤ x. But ee = e so α v β iff for all e ∈ E,
α(e) ≤ β(e)v(e)
v(e) iff α(e) ≤ β(e) iff α E β.
The following theorem shows the relationship between exp and v.
Theorem 2 For all α, β ∈ A(A), if v is an isotone valuation then α v β
implies α exp β.
Proof. We suppose that α : E → R and β : D → R. We have
exp(α, v) =
∑
{α(e)v(e) : e ∈ E}
=
∑
{
∑
{α(x)v(x) : x ∈ Ed} : d ∈ D}
≤
∑
{β(d)v(d) : d ∈ D}
= exp(β, v),
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where the second line follows because {Ed : d ∈ D} is a set theoretic partition
on E (see lemma 15of Appendix A) and the third line because
∑
{α(x)v(x) : x ∈ Ed} ≤
∑
{α(x)v(d) : x ∈ Ed}
≤
∑
{β(d)v(x) : x ∈ Ed}
= β(d)
∑
{v(x) : x ∈ Ed}
= β(d)v(d),
where the first line follows because x ≤ d implies v(x) ≤ v(d), as v is isotone,
and the second line follows because α v β by hypothesis. In fact, α v β
implies α(x) ≤ β(d)v(x)
v(d) , for all x ∈ Ed, so α(x)v(d) ≤ β(d)v(x). The last
line follows because
∑
{v(x) : x ∈ Ed} = v(
∨
Ed) = v(d) (see theorem 17 of
Appendix A).
Of course, we cannot substitute implication with equivalence in the preceding
theorem, because exp(a, v) ≤ exp(β, v) may hold between acts α and β whose
domains E and D are such that E  D and D  E. We observe that, as a
consequence of the two preceding theorems, α E β implies α exp β.
Theorem 3 (A(A),v) is a partially ordered set.
Proof. Reflexivity. For all act α : E → R, we have: 1) E ≤ E, because ≤
is a partial order on the set of all partitions on A (see theorem 19 of Appendix
A); 2) for all e ∈ E, α(e) ≤ α(ee)
v(e)
v(ee)
because, for all e ∈ E, ee = e (the only
x ∈ E such that e ≤ x being e itself), so v(e)
v(ee)
= 1. This proves that α v α.
Transitivity. We assume that α v β and β v γ, where α : E → R,
β : D → R and γ : G → R. 1) By hypothesis, E ≤ D and D ≤ G, so E ≤ G,
because ≤ is a partial order on partitions. 2) By hypothesis, for all e ∈ E,
we have α(e) ≤ β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
and for all d ∈ D we have β(d) ≤ γ(gd)
v(d)
v(gd)
: in
particular, β(de) ≤ γ(gde)
v(de)
v(gde )
. By definition, e ≤ de ≤ gde and e ≤ ge, so
gde = ge, because there is only one x ∈ G such that e ≤ x, so β(de) ≤ γ(ge)
v(de)
v(ge)
.
Then we have
α(e) ≤ β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
≤ γ(ge)
v(de)
v(ge)
v(e)
v(de)
= γ(ge)
v(e)
v(ge)
.
This proves that α v γ.
Antisymmetry. We assume that α v β and β v α. 1) By hypothesis,
E ≤ D and D ≤ E, so E = D, because ≤ is a partial order on partitions. 2) By
hypothesis, for all e ∈ E, we have α(e) ≤ β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
and for all d ∈ D we have
β(d) ≤ α(ed)
v(d)
v(ed)
. As E = D, α(e) ≤ β(e)v(e)
v(e) = β(e). For the same reason,
we have β(e) ≤ α(e)v(e)
v(e) = α(e), so α(e) = β(e). This proves that α = β.
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4 The lattice of acts
Given an act β : D → R and a partition E such that E ≤ D, we can downgrade
β to an act βE : E → R setting, for all e ∈ E
βE(e) = β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
.
We have βE v β by definition of βE . In fact, βE is the best approximation
from below to β in A(E), as shown in corollary 2.
Lemma 4 (A(A),v) is closed with respect to inf.
Proof. We know that Π(A) is a lattice, by theorem 19 of Appendix A.
Given α : E → R and β : D → R, we define φ : E ∧ D → R setting, for all
z ∈ E ∧D,
φ(z) = min(αE∧D(z), βE∧D(z)).
We show that φ = inf(α, β).
1. φ v α, β. By definition, we have E ∧ D ≤ E. Then we have, for all
z ∈ E ∧D,
φ(z) = min(α(ez)
v(z)
v(ez)
, β(dz)
v(z)
v(dz)
) ≤ α(ez)
v(z)
v(ez)
,
so φ v α. In the same way, we can prove that φ v β
2. We prove that, for all γ : G → R, if γ v α and γ v β, then γ v φ.
By hypothesis G ≤ E and G ≤ D, so G ≤ E ∧ D. We have to show that, for
all g ∈ G, γ(g) ≤ φ(zg)
v(g)
v(zg)
where zg is the element of E ∧D such that g ≤ zg.
By definition of φ, this amounts to prove that
γ(g) ≤ min(αE∧D(zg), βE∧D(zg))
v(g)
v(zg)
= min(α(ezg )
v(zg)
v(ezg )
, β(dzg )
v(zg)
v(dzg )
)
v(g)
v(zg)
= min(
α(ezg )
v(ezg )
,
β(dzg )
v(dzg )
)v(g),
where zg ≤ ezg and zg ≤ dzg . By hypothesis, for all g ∈ G, we have γ(g) ≤
α(eg)
v(g)
v(eg)
and γ(g) ≤ β(dg)
v(g)
v(dg)
, so
γ(g) ≤ min(
α(eg)
v(eg)
,
β(dg)
v(dg)
)v(g).
We conclude the proof by observing that, from g ≤ eg and g ≤ zg ≤ ezg , we can
derive eg = ezg , because G and E are partitions. In the same way, from g ≤ dg
and g ≤ zg ≤ dzg , we have dg = dzg . This proves that φ is the greatest lower
bound of α and β.
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Given an act β : D → R and a partition G such that D ≤ G, we can upgrade
β to an act βG : G→ R setting, for all g ∈ G,
βG(g) = max(β(x)
v(g)
v(x)
: x ∈ Dg).
We have β v βG. In fact d ∈ Dgd so β(d)
v(g)
v(d) ≤ β
G(g) and then β(d) ≤
βG(g)v(d)
v(g) , thus proving that β v β
G. From corollary 2 we can see that βG is
the best approximation from above to β in A(G).
Lemma 5 (A(A),v) is closed with respect to sup.
Proof. Given α : E → R and β : D → R, we define φ : E ∨D → R setting,
for all z ∈ E ∨D,
φ(z) = max(αE∨D(z), βE∨D(z)).
We show that φ = sup(α, β).
1. α, β v φ. In order to show that α v φ, we must prove that, for all
e ∈ E, α(e) ≤ φ(ze)
v(e)
v(ze)
. We have
φ(ze) = max(α
E∨D(ze), β
E∨D(ze))
= max(v(ze)max(
α(x)
v(x)
: x ∈ Eze), v(ze)max(
β(x)
v(x)
: x ∈ Dze))
≥ v(ze)max(
α(x)
v(x)
: x ∈ Eze),
so
φ(ze)
v(e)
v(ze)
≥ v(ze)max(
α(x)
v(x)
: x ∈ Eze)
v(e)
v(ze)
= v(e)max(
α(x)
v(x)
: x ∈ Eze)
≥ v(e)
α(e)
v(e)
= α(e),
where the third line follows because e ∈ Eze and then max(
α(x)
v(x) : x ∈ Eze) ≥
α(e)
v(e) . In the same way we can prove that β v φ.
2. For all γ : G → R, if α v γ and β v γ, then φ v γ. By hypothesis
E ≤ G and D ≤ G, so E ∨ D ≤ G. We have to show that, for all z ∈ E ∨ D,
φ(z) ≤ γ(gz)
v(z)
v(gz)
. By hypothesis we have, for all e ∈ E, α(e) ≤ γ(ge)
v(e)
v(ge)
so
α(e)v(ge)
v(e) ≤ γ(ge). In particular, for all x ∈ Ez we have α(x)
v(gx)
v(x) ≤ γ(gx).
When x ∈ Ez we have also x ≤ z ≤ gz and x ≤ gx, so gz = gx because G and
E are partitions. Then we can conclude that, for all x ∈ Ez, α(x)
v(gz )
v(x) ≤ γ(gz)
and so
max(α(x)
v(gz)
v(x)
: x ∈ Ez) ≤ γ(gz)
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and
v(z)max(
α(x)
v(x)
: x ∈ Ez) ≤ γ(gz)
v(z)
v(gz)
.
In the same way, from the hypothesis for all d ∈ D, β(d) ≤ γ(gd)
v(d)
v(gd)
, we can
prove that
v(z)max(
β(x)
v(x)
: x ∈ Dz) ≤ γ(gz)
v(z)
v(gz)
,
so we can conclude that
γ(gz)
v(z)
v(gz)
≥ max(v(z)max(
α(x)
v(x)
: x ∈ Ez), v(z)max(
β(x)
v(x)
: x ∈ Dz))
= max(αE∨D(z), βE∨D(z))
= φ(z).
Theorem 6 (A(A),v) is a lattice with (A(E),E) as a sublattice.
Proof. (A(A),v) is a lattice by the preceding lemmas. We prove that
inf (A(E),E) is a sublattice of (A(A),v). In the first place, we show that
for all α, β ∈ A(E), infE(α, β) = infv(α, β), where infE denotes inf in A(E)
and infv denotes inf in A(A). We observe that infE(α, β) is a lower bound of
{α, β} in (A(A),v) because infE(α, β) E α, β implies infE(α, β) v α, β, by
theorem 1. We can see that infE(α, β) is the greatest lower bound of {α, β} in
(A(A),v) as follows: we suppose that ξ v α, β, where ξ ∈ A(A) is an act
ξ : G → R where G ≤ E, and we show that ξ v infE(α, β). So we must show
that, for all g ∈ G, ξ(g) ≤ infE(α, β)(eg)
v(g)
v(eg)
= min(α(eg), β(eg))
v(g)
v(eg)
. (We
remember that α and β are functions E → R and infE is defined pointwise.)
By hypothesis, ξ(g) ≤ α(eg)
v(g)
v(eg)
and ξ(g) ≤ β(eg)
v(g)
v(eg)
, so
ξ(g) ≤ min(α(eg)
v(g)
v(eg)
, β(eg)
v(g)
v(eg)
)
= min(α(eg), β(eg))
v(g)
v(eg)
,
where the second line follows because min(ax, bx) = min(a, b)x when x ≥ 0.
Finally, we show that supE(α, β) = supv(α, β). On one side, supE(α, β) is an
upper bound of {α, β} in (A(A),v), because α, β E supE(α, β) and so α,
β v supE(α, β) by theorem 1. On the other side, for all ξ ∈ A(A) such that α,
β v ξ, we can show that supE(α, β) v ξ. In fact, ξ : G→ R for some G ≥ E,
so by hypothesis we have α(e) ≤ ξ(ge)
v(e)
v(ge)
and β(e) ≤ ξ(ge)
v(e)
v(ge)
. Then
sup
E
(α, β)(e) = max(α(e), β(e)) ≤ ξ(ge)
v(e)
v(ge)
.
thus proving that supE(α, β) v ξ.
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Corollary 7
1. If β : D → R and E ≤ D, then βE =
∨
{ξ ∈ A(E) : ξ v β}, where
∨
is
taken in A(A).
2. If β : D → R and D ≤ G, then βG =
∧
{ξ ∈ A(G) : β v ξ}, where
∧
is
taken in A(A).
Proof. 1. On one side, we show that βE is an upper bound of {ξ ∈
A(E) : ξ v β}. If ξ : E → R is such that ξ v β then, for all e ∈ E,
ξ(e) ≤ β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
= βE(e). So ξ E βE and then ξ v βE by theorem 1. On
the other side, let δ : E → R be an upper bound of {ξ ∈ A(E) : ξ v β}, then
βE v δ because βE v β, by definition of βE .
2. On one side, we show that βG is a lower bound of {ξ ∈ A(G) : β v ξ}.
If ξ : G → R is such that β v ξ then, for all d ∈ D, β(d) ≤ ξ(gd)
v(d)
v(gd)
and
β(d)v(gd)
v(d) ≤ ξ(gd). We observe that, for all g ∈ G, g = gd holds for all d ∈ Dg,
so β(d)v(g)
v(d) ≤ ξ(g) holds for all d ∈ Dg and then
max(β(x)
v(g)
v(x)
: x ∈ Dg) ≤ ξ(g).
In this way we have shown that, for all g ∈ G, βG(g) ≤ ξ(g) and so βG G ξ.
By theorem 1 we can conclude that βG v ξ. On the other side, let δ : G→ R
be a lower bound of {ξ ∈ A(G) : β v ξ}, then δ v βG because β v βG, as
we have shown before the preceding lemma.
In the preceding corollary,
∨
can indifferently be taken in A(E) and
∧
in
A(G).
Corollary 8 If α : E → R and β : D → R then inf(α, β) = inf(αE∧D, βE∧D)
and sup(α, β) = sup(αE∨D, βE∨D).
Proof. We denote with inf the greatest lower bound taken in (A(A),v)
and with infE∧D the greatest lower bound taken in (A(E),E∧D). As αE∧D and
βE∧D are acts in A(E∧D), for all z ∈ E∧D we have infE∧D(αE∧D, βE∧D)(z) =
min(αE∧D(z), βE∧D(z)) because infE∧D is defined pointwise. But inf(α, β)(z) =
min(αE∧D(z), βE∧D(z)) by definition, so inf(α, β) = inf(αE∧D, βE∧D). Finally,
we have infE∧D(αE∧D, βE∧D) = inf(αE∧D, βE∧D) by theorem 6. The same
kind of proof works for the least upper bound.
5 The comparison of acts
We can summarize the different ways of comparing acts introduced so far as
follows. Given α : E → R and β : D → R, we can always compare α with β
in exp. If α and β have the same domain, E = D, they can also be compared
in E . We know that α E β implies α exp β. (We have α E β implies
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α v β by theorem 1 and α v β implies α exp β by theorem 2.) If α and β
have different, but comparable, domains, i.e. E ≤ D or D ≤ E, then we can
compare α with β in v. We know that α v β implies α exp β by theorem
2. If E and D are incomparable, we can resort to the best approximations from
below to α and β in A(E ∧ D). So we define a preference relation α ⊳ β iff
αE∧D ≤E∧D βE∧D. An intuitive meaning may be attached to ⊳ if we observe
how the set of conditions E ∧D arises from E and D by meet. As an example,
we set E = {↑ $, ↓ $} and D = {↑ £, ↓ £}, where ↑ means ‘rises’ and ↓ means
‘sinks’. Then E ∧ D = {↑ $& ↑ £, ↑ $& ↓ £, ↓ $& ↑ £, ↓ $& ↓ £} is a natural
common set of conditions for αE∧D and βE∧D where every condition e ∈ E
splits in the different cases {e ∧ d : d ∈ D}.
We can easily prove that ⊳ is reflexive transitive and antisymmetric. Firstly,
we observe that αE∧D ≤E∧D βE∧D iff for all e ∧ d in E ∧ D,
α(e)
v(e) ≤
β(d)
v(d) . In
fact,
αE∧D(e ∧ d) ≤ βE∧D(e ∧ d) iff α(e)
v(e ∧ d)
v(e)
≤ β(e)
v(e ∧ d)
v(d)
iff
α(e)
v(e)
≤
β(d)
v(d)
.
Now we can easily see that ⊳ is a partial order. The following theorem shows
that ⊳ can be seen as a generalization of ≤E and ≤v.
Lemma 9 If α : E → R then αE = α and αE = α.
Proof. For all e ∈ E, αE(ee) = α(e)
v(e)
v(ee)
= α(e), because ee = e. For all
e ∈ E, αB(e) = max{α(x) v(e)
v(x) : x ∈ Ee} = α(e), because Ee = {e}.
Theorem 10 If α : E → R and β : D → R then
1. E = D implies α ⊳ β iff α ≤E β,
2. α ≤v β implies α ⊳ β; α ⊳ β and E ≤ D imply α ≤v β.
Proof. 1. If E = D then E∧D = E and so α ⊳ β iff αE ≤E βE iff α ≤E β,
as αE = α and βE = βD = β, by the lemma.
2. We must show that αE∧D ≤E∧D βE∧D. By our hypothesis α ≤v β,
E ≤ D holds, so we can reduce ourselves to prove that αE ≤E βE i.e. α ≤E βE .
So we have to prove that α(e) ≤ βE(e) = β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
, what follows from our
hypothesis. Now we assume α ⊳ β and E ≤ D, then αE∧D ≤E∧D βE∧D and
α ≤E βE , so for all e ∈ E, α(a) ≤ β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
and α ≤v β follows.
Dually, we can define a preference relation setting α ◭ β iff αE∨D ≤E∨D
βE∨D. Now αE∨D and βE∨D are the best approximation to α and β from
above in A(E ∨D). The join of the set of conditions E and D is trivial in the
example above. In general, if |E| = |D| = 2, then E = {e,¬e} and D = {d,¬d},
where ¬ denotes the complement operation, so E ∨ D = 1, the top element
of the lattice Π(A). We can give a non-trivial example of E ∨ D as follows.
We consider the interval [0, 1) as the price range of a good and we define five
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subintervals a = [0, 0.2), b = [0.2, 0.4), c = [0.4, 0.6), d = [0.6, 0.8), e = [0.8, 1).
Let A = P(A), where A = {a, b, c, d, e}. We identify each x ∈ A with the
singleton {x} and denote with a|b|c|d|e the least partition in Π(A). There are
52 partitions in Π(A), but we can fix our attention on the four-elements lattice of
the following figure, where juxtaposition denotes set-union (i.e. abc = a∪ b∪ c).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅ac|b|ed
a|b|c|ed
ab|c|ed
abc|ed
We set E = ac|b|ed and D = ab|c|ed. Let α : E → R and β : D → R be two
acts. As we suppose that [0, 1) be the price range of a good, then α(b) represents
the payoff of α when the price is in [0.2, 0.4). The same holds for β. Now E ∧D
is the set of conditions containing all non-empty meets of conditions in E with
conditions in D and E ∨D is the set of all (minimal) common-joins from E and
D (joins of conditions of α that arise also as joins of conditions of β).
We can easily prove that ◭ is reflexive and antisymmetric. Firstly, we ob-
serve that αE∨D ≤E∨D βE∨D iff for all w ∈ E ∨D, αE∨D(w) ≤ βE∨D(w) and
this happens iff max{α(x)
v(x) : x ∈ Ew} ≤ max{
β(x)
v(x) : x ∈ Dw}. Transitivity fails,
as can be easily seen by a counterexemple.
The following theorem shows that ◭ can be seen as a generalization of ≤E
and ≤v.
Theorem 11 If α : E → R and β : D → R then
1. E = D implies α ◭ β iff α ≤E β,
2. α ≤v β implies α ⊳ β; α ◭ β and E ≤ D imply α ≤v β.
Proof. 1. If E = D then E ∨D = E so α ◭ β iff αE ≤E βE iff α ≤E β, the
the lemma above.
2. We assume α ≤v β so E ≤ D and, for all e ∈ E, α(a) ≤ β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
and
so α(a)v(de)
v(e) ≤ β(de). We must show that α
E∨D ≤E∨D βE∨D, i.e. αD ≤D β.
So we can reduce ourselves to prove that, for all d ∈ D, αD(d) ≤ β(d), i.e.
max{α(x) v(d)
v(x) : x ∈ Ed} ≤ β(d). If x ∈ Ed then dx = d, so by our hypothesis
we have α(x) v(d)
v(x) ≤ β(d) for all d ∈ D and the result follows. We assume α ◭ β
and E ≤ D, then αE∨D ≤E∨D βE∨D, i.e. αD ≤D β and so max{α(x)
v(d)
v(x) : x ∈
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Ed} ≤ β(d) for all d ∈ D. If x ∈ Ed then α(x)
v(d)
v(x) ≤ β(d) and α(x) ≤ β(d)
v(x)
v(d) .
But for all e ∈ E, we have e ∈ Ede , so α(e) ≤ β(de)
v(e)
v(de)
and α ≤v β follows.
A Partitions in finite distributive lattices
The set theoretic notion of partition, introduced in the first paragraph, can be
generalized as follows. Let A be a finite distributive lattice, we say that E ⊆ A
is a partition of A if
1.
∨
E = 1,
2. e2 ∧ e2 = 0, for all e2, e2 ∈ E with e2 6= e2,
3. e 6= 0, for all e ∈ E.
We denote with Π(A) the set of all partitions of A. Of course, every set
theoretic partition {Xi : i ∈ I} is also an algebraic partition of P(X), the
Boolean algebra of all subsets of X . In the following we speak generically of
partitions, leaving to the context to decide whether algebraic or set theoretical
partitions are involved. In general, we speak of a partition on (a set) X when
a set theoretical partition is intended, and speak of a partition of (a lattice) A
when an algebraic partition is intended.
Lemma 12 For all partition E of A and all e ∈ E, E − {e} is not a partition
of A
Proof. We set E′ =.E − {e} and suppose that E′ is a partition, then∨
E′ = 1 and so
e = e ∧
∨
E′ =
∨
{e ∧ e′ : e′ ∈ E′} = 0,
because e, e′ ∈ E and e 6= e′. But e 6= 0, because E is a partition.
We define a relation on partitions setting E ≤ D iff for all e ∈ E there is a
d ∈ D such that e ≤ d. In this case, we say that E is a refinement of (or is finer
than) D. The following lemma shows that there is only one d of this kind, so
we can speak of the d ∈ D such that e ≤ d and denote it with de.
Lemma 13 If E ≤ D then, for all e ∈ E, there is only one d ∈ D such that
e ≤ d.
Proof. We suppose that, for some e ∈ E, there are d and d′ in D such that
d 6= d′ and e ≤ d, d′. Then e ≤ d ∧ d′ = 0, but this is absurd because E is a
partition.
The following lemma shows that dx, as a function E → D, is surjective.
Lemma 14 If E ≤ D then, for all d ∈ D, there is e ∈ E such that e ≤ d.
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Proof. As E ≤ D, for all e ∈ E there is a d ∈ D such that e ≤ d. We
suppose that there is d ∈ D such that, for all e ∈ E, e  d, then we have
1 =
∨
E ≤
∨
( D − {d}). Then for all x, y ∈ D − {d}, we have x ∧ y = 0.
Finally, for all x ∈ D− {d}, we have x 6= 0. So D−{d} is a partition of A, but
this is absurd by lemma 12.
If E ≤ D then, for all d ∈ D, we define Ed = {x ∈ E : x ≤ d}: we shall
prove that d =
∨
Ed.
Lemma 15 If E ≤ D then:
1. {Ex : x ∈ D} is a (set theoretic) partition on E,
2. {
∨
Ex : x ∈ D} is an (algebraic) partition of A.
Proof. 1. Firstly, we prove that
⋃
{Ex : x ∈ D} = E. On one side we have⋃
{Ex : x ∈ D} ⊆ E, because Ex ⊆ E for all x ∈ D. On the other side, E ⊆⋃
{Ex : x ∈ D} because, for all e ∈ E, there is a x ∈ D such that e ≤ x and
e ∈ Ex. Then we prove that, for all x, x′ ∈ D, x 6= x′, we have Ex ∩ Ex′ = ∅,
because y ∈ Ex ∩ Ex′ implies y ≤ x and y ≤ x′ so that y ≤ x ∧ x′ = 0, that is
absurd. Finally, we have Ex 6= ∅, for all x ∈ D, by lemma 14
2. Firstly, we have∨
{
∨
Ex : x ∈ D} =
∨⋃
{Ex : x ∈ D} =
∨
E = 1
because, by point 1), we have
⋃
{Ex : x ∈ D} = E. Then we have, for all x,
y ∈ D, x 6= y,
(
∨
Ex) ∧ (
∨
Ey) =
∨
{a ∧ b : a ∈ Ex, b ∈ Ey} = 0
because Ex ∩ Ey = ∅, by point1). Finally, for all x ∈ D, we have
∨
Ex 6= 0,
because Ex 6= ∅ by point 1).
Lemma 16 If E ≤ D then for all x, y ∈ D, if x 6= y then x ∧
∨
Ey = 0.
Proof. We have x ∧
∨
Ey =
∨
{x ∧ z : z ∈ Ey} = 0, because z ≤ y implies
x ∧ z ≤ x ∧ y = 0.
Theorem 17 If E ≤ D then, for all d ∈ D, d =
∨
Ed.
Proof. We observe that
d ≤ 1 =
∨
{
∨
Ex : x ∈ D},
by point 2) of lemma 15. So
d = d ∧
∨
{
∨
Ex : x ∈ D}
=
∨
{d ∧
∨
Ex : x ∈ D}
=
∨
Ed.
The last line follows because d ∧
∨
Ex = 0 when d 6= x, by lemma 16, and
d ∧
∨
Ex =
∨
Ed when x = d, as
∨
Ed ≤ d (d is an upper bound for Ed).
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Lemma 18 For all E, D ∈ Π(A), for all e ∈ E there is a d ∈ D such that
e ∧ d 6= 0.
Proof. We have e ∧
∨
D = e 6= 0, then
∨
{e ∧ d : d ∈ D} 6= 0 so there is a
d ∈ D such that e ∧ d 6= 0.
Theorem 19 For all distributive finite lattice A, Π(A) is a bounded lattice with
respect to ≤. If A is a Boolean algebra, then At(A) is the bottom element of
Π(A)
Proof. Firstly we prove that Π(A) is partially ordered by ≤. Reflexivity
and transitivity of ≤ are immediate. As for antisimmetry, we suppose E ≤ D
and D ≤ E and prove that E = D. If e ∈ E then there is d ∈ D such that e ≤ d
and e′ ∈ E such that d ≤ e′: so e ≤ e′. As e, e′ ∈ E, if e 6= e′ then e∧e′ = 0, but
e ∧ e′ = e and e 6= 0, so we conclude that e = e′. As d is sandwiched between
e and e′, we have d = e, so e ∈ D. In the same way we prove that D ⊆ E, so
E = D.
Secondly we prove that Π(A) is a bounded lattice with respect to ≤. Π(A)
has a greatest element {1}, where 1 is the top element of A. Π(A) contains the
greatest lower bound E ∧D for all E, D ∈ Π(A). For every E, D ∈ Π(A), we
set
H = {e ∧ d : e ∈ E, d ∈ D, e ∧ d 6= 0}
We observe that H is not empty, by the above lemma, and we prove that
H = E ∧D. In the first place we prove that E ∧D is a partition of A. In fact,
we have
∨
{e ∧ d : e ∈ E, d ∈ D} =
∨
{
∨
{e ∧ d : d ∈ D} : e ∈ E}
=
∨
{e ∧
∨
{d : d ∈ D} : e ∈ E}
=
∨
{e : e ∈ E} ∧
∨
{d : d ∈ D}
= 1,
and we have (e ∧ d) ∧ (e′ ∧ d′) = 0 whenever e, e′ ∈ E′and d, d′ ∈ D. Now we
can easily see that H is E ∧D. On one side, H ≤ E, D because e ∧ d ≤ e and
e∧d ≤ d, for all e∧d ∈ H . On the other side, for all Z ∈ Π(A) such that Z ≤ E,
D, we have Z ≤ H , because for all z ∈ Z there are e ∈ E and d ∈ D such that
z ≤ e and z ≤ d and then z ≤ e∧d. As A is finite, the bottom element of Π(A)
is
∧
Π(A). The existence E ∨D follows by theorem 2.31 of [4].)
Now we suppose that A is a finite Boolean algebra. Firstly, we prove that
At(A), the set of all atoms in A, is a partition of A. By definition of atom,
we have a ∧ a′ = 0 for all a, a′ ∈ At(A). Then we remember that, in a finite
Boolean algebra A, we have a =
∨
{x ∈ At(A) : x ≤ a} for all a ∈ A, (see
lemma 5.4 of [4]) so 1 =
∨
At(A). Now we can prove that, for all E ∈ Π(A),
At(A) ≤ E: in fact, for all a ∈ At(A) we have a ≤
∨
E = 1 an so there is an
e ∈ E such that a ≤ e, by lemma 5.11 (iii) of [4].
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In the above theorem E ∨ D is described as
∧
{Z ∈ Π(A) : E ≤ Z and
D ≤ Z}. As a result of this definition from above, we have no idea of the inner
constitution of E ∨ D. The following two theorems are devoted to this scope.
For all X ⊆ A, we define [X ] as the least subalgebra of A including X , i.e. the
intersection of all B ⊆ A such that X ⊆ B. We denote with [X ]∨ the least
subset of A that is closed with respect to finite (even empty) joins.
Theorem 20 If A is a finite distributive lattice and E partition of A, then
1. [E]∨ = [E],
2. [E]∨ is closed with respect to complement, i.e. [E]∨ is a Boolean algebra.
Proof. 1. We show that [E]∨ is the least subalgebra of A including E.
Firstly we show that [E]∨ is a subalgebra of A. We observe that 1 ∈ [E]∨
because
∨
E = 1 and 0 ∈ [E]∨ because
∨
∅ = 0. Obviously, [E]∨ is closed with
respect to ∨ by definition. We prove that if a, b ∈ [E]∨ then a∧b ∈ [E]. If a = 0
or b = 0 then a ∧ b ∈ [E]. Then we suppose a 6=, 0 and b 6= 0. By hypothesis,
there are some non empty subsets X , Y ⊆ E such that a =
∨
X and b =
∨
Y .
So
a ∧ b = (
∨
X) ∧ (
∨
Y ) =
∨
{x ∧ y : x ∈ X , y ∈ Y }.
As E is a partition, x ∧ y = 0 when x 6= y and x ∧ y = x when x = y, so
a ∧ b =
{
0 if X ∩ Y = ∅,∨
(X ∩ Y ) if X ∩ Y 6= ∅.
In both cases, a ∧ b ∈ [E]∨, as X ∩ Y ⊆ E. Trivially E ⊆ [E]∨. Minimality
follows because, for all B ⊆ A such that E ⊆ B, [E]∨ ⊆ B.
2. We prove that for all a ∈ [E]∨ there is an element ¬a that is the comple-
ment of a in [E]∨. We know that, by hypothesis, a =
∨
X for some X ⊆ E, so
we set ¬a =
∨
(E −X). Then we have
a ∨ ¬a =
∨
X ∨
∨
(E −X) =
∨
E = 1
and
a ∧ ¬a =
∨
X ∧
∨
(E −X)
=
∨
{x ∧ y : x ∈ X , y ∈ E −X}
= 0,
as X ∩ (E −X) = ∅ and x ∧ y = 0 when x 6= y.
Theorem 21 If E, D ∈ Π(A) then E ≤ D iff [D] ⊆ [E].
Proof. We assume E ≤ D. If x ∈ [D] then x =
∨
D′ for some D′ ⊆ D. For
all d′ ∈ D′, we have d′ =
∨
Ed′ by 17, so we have x =
∨
{
∨
Ed′ : d
′ ∈ D′} and
x ∈ [E]. We assume [D] ⊆ [E]. Then D ⊆ [E] and
∨
D ∈ [E], so for all e ∈ E
we have e ≤ 1 =
∨
D. As every e ∈ E is ∨-irreducible in [E], there is a d ∈ D
such that e ≤ d, by lemma 5.11 of [4], so E ≤ D.
Now we can give a more constructive description of E ∨D.
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Theorem 22 If A is a finite distributive lattice and E, D are partitions of A,
then E ∨D = At([E] ∩ [D]).
Proof. Firstly we observe that [E], [D] are subalgebras of A, so [E]∩ [D] is
also a subalgebra of A. As [E], [D] are Boolean algebras, by 20, so is [E] ∩ [D]
and we can speak of At([E] ∩ [D]). As At([E] ∩ [D]) is a partition of [E] ∩ [D]
and [E] ∩ [D] is a subalgebra of A, At([E] ∩ [D]) is a partition of A. Firstly,
we show that E ≤ At([E] ∩ [D]). In fact, [At([E] ∩ [D])] = [E] ∩ [D] ⊆ [E] so,
by theorem 21, we can conclude that E ≤ At([E] ∩ [D]). In the same way we
prove that D ≤ At([E]∩ [D]). Finally, we prove that, for all G such that E ≤ G
and D ≤ G, we have At([E] ∩ [D]) ≤ G. From our hypothesis, by theorem 21,
[G] ⊆ [E] and [G] ⊆ [D], so [G] ⊆ [E] ∩ [D] = [At([E] ∩ [D])] and by theorem
21 we have At([E] ∩ [D]) ≤ G.
The following theorem shows that every element of [E], different from 0, is
uniquely generated by
∨
from E.
Theorem 23 For all E ∈ Π(A), if X, Y ⊆ E and
∨
X =
∨
Y , then X = Y .
Proof. If x ∈ X then x ≤
∨
X =
∨
Y . If for all y ∈ Y we have x ∧ y = 0,
then x = x ∧
∨
Y =
∨
{x ∧ y : y ∈ Y } = 0, but this is absurd because x ∈ E
and E is a partition, so there is y ∈ Y such that x ∧ y 6= 0. As x, y ∈ E, this
implies x = y, so x ∈ Y and X ⊆ Y . In the same way we prove that Y ⊆ X .
B Allais Paradox and intrinsic expected value
A decision problem leading to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion has been
presented by Maurice Allais in 1953 (see [1]). The acts involved are α, α′, β
and β′, all having a common domain E = {e1, e2, e3}. The probabilities of the
three conditions are p(e1) = 0.01, p(e2) = 0, 1 and p(e3) = 0.89. The rewards,
in dollars, are:
e1 e2 e3
α 500000 500000 500000
α′ 0 2500000 500000
e1 e2 e3
β 500000 500000 0
β′ 0 2500000 0
The decision maker must choose between α and α′ and between β and β′: if
he maximizes expected utility, then α′ is better than α and β′ is better then β,
but empirical evidence shows that a great many people prefer α to α′ and β′
to β. So maximizing expected value cannot be considered as an universal rule
of choice between acts. This situation is generally explained by observing that
the choice between α and α′ is a decision problem qualitatively different from
the choice between β and β′ The choice of α stems from risk aversion, because
α is a constant function that banishes every aleatory aspect, so the decision
maker leaves out any question about probability and expected value. On the
other side, β and β′ are both risky acts and consideration of expected value is
appropriate. Before going farther in the analysis of Allais Paradox, we introduce
some concepts of general character.
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When X and Y are partially ordered sets, we say that f : X → Y is
an order embedding when x ≤ x′ in X iff f(x) ≤ f(x′) in Y . (It can be
easily seen that every order embedding is injective.) If f : A(E) → A(E) is
an order embedding, then any decision problem about acts in A(E) can be
reduced to a decision problem about acts in f [A(E)], in the following sense. If
≤ represents desirability of acts and we are asked if α ≤ β, then we can shift the
problem to desirability of f(α) and f(β): if we find that f(α) ≤ f(β), then also
α ≤ β. We focus on the family of order embeddings associated to positive affine
transformations of R. For all pair of real numbers h > 0 and k, τ(x) = hx+ k
is the positive affine transformation associated to (h, k). Now we consider the
function f : A(E) → A(E) such that f(α) = τ ◦ α: we have, for all e ∈ E,
f(α)(e) = τ(α(e)) = hα(e) + k.
Theorem 24 If f : A(E) → A(E), where f(α) = τ ◦ α and τ is the positive
affine transformations τ(x) = hx+ k, then
1. f is an order embedding of A(E) in itself,
2. for all α ∈ A(E) and all valuation v : A → [0, 1], exp(τ ◦ α, v) =
τ(exp(α, v)),
3. exp(α, v) ≤ exp(α′, v) iff exp(f(α), v) ≤ exp(f(α′)).
Proof. 1. We have α ≤ β iff, for all e ∈ E, α(e) ≤ β(e) iff hα(e) + k ≤
hβ(e) + k iff f(α) ≤ f(β).
2. We have
exp(τ ◦ α, v) =
∑
{(hα(e) + k)v(e) : e ∈ E}
=
∑
{hα(e)v(e) + kv(e) : e ∈ E}
= h
∑
{α(e)v(e) : e ∈ E}+ k
∑
{v(e) : e ∈ E}
= h exp(α, v) + k.
3.Trivial.
The same kind of order embedding can be defined from A(A) to A(A) and
a similar theorem can be proved.
Now we can give an equivalent formulation of Allais Paradox by defining
four acts as follows:
e1 e2 e3
f(α) 1 1 1
f(α′) 0 5 1
e1 e2 e3
f(β) 1 1 0
f(β′) 0 5 0
The transformation involved is τ(x) = 1/500000x. As a consequence of point
1) in the above theorem, we have exp(f(α), v) ≤ exp(f(α′), v) and exp(f(β), v) ≤
exp(f(β′), v), but we may still prefer f(α) to f(α′) by risk aversion, as in the
original formulation of Allais Paradox. We underline that only an equivalence of
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mathematical character is discussed here: f preserves ≤, but may not preserve
the psychological impact of acts.
We can give a more abstract formulation of Allais Paradox with the following
acts:
e1 e2 e3
α x x x
α′ 0 y x
e1 e2 e3
β x x 0
β′ 0 y 0
We assume x, y > 0. The particular case above is obtained setting x = 1 and y =
5, but not every choice of x and y gives place to an instance of Allais Paradox.
By definition of the four acts, we have exp(α, v) ≤ exp(α′, v) iff exp(β, v) ≤
exp(β′, v), but in particular we should also have exp(α, v) < exp(α′, v). We
observe that
exp(α, v) < exp(α′, v) iff x · 0.01 + x · 0.1 + x · 0.89 < y · 0.1 + x · 0.89
iff x · 1.1 < y,
so we can conclude that α′ is better then α as far as y > x + 110x. Thus Allais
Paradox can be sharpened by choosing a value of y just a little bigger than
x+ 110x: if risk aversion works when y is five times x, it should also be at work
with a lesser value of y. As for β and β′, there is no risk aversion because both
are risky acts. But there is still another aspect of acts that can be considered
in the analysis of Allais Paradox.
The consequences of acts are real numbers and we can rather naively say that
big numbers correspond to big rewards, but the meaning of ‘big’ is dependent
from the context. We assume that the context of an act is the total sum of
rewards, so a reward is a really big one if it is a relevant part of this total.
For all act α : E → R, we define T (α) =
∑
{α(e) : e ∈ E} and we call
T (α) the total of α. When T (α) > 0, we define an act α¯ : E → R setting
α¯(e) = 1
T (α)α(e): we call α¯ the standardization of α. Clearly, T (α¯) = 1, because
1
T (α)
∑
{α¯(e) : e ∈ E} = 1. If α(e) ≥ 0, for all e ∈ E, then α¯[E] ⊆ [0, 1]. Finally,
we define
exp(α, v) = exp(α¯, v)
and call exp(α, v) the intrinsic expected value of α. In the original form of
Allais Paradox, we have exp(α, v) > exp(α′, v) and exp(β, v) < exp(β′, v): if
the decision maker maximizes the intrinsic expected value, then α is preferred
to α′ and β′ to β. So the paradox can be explained non only by risk aversion,
but also by a different valuation of the performance of an act, based on the
ratio between the expected value and the total amount of possible rewards. As
a consequence of point 3) of the following theorem, this kind of solution works
for all the instances of the original form of the Allais Paradox obtained by a
similarity, i.e. a positive affine transformation τ(x) = hx+ k with k = 0.
Theorem 25 If f : A(E) → A(E), where f(α) = τ ◦ α and τ(x) = hx, with
k > 0, then:
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1. exp(α¯, v) = 1
T (α) exp(α, v),
2. exp(τ ◦ α, v) = exp(α, v),
3. exp(α, v) ≤ exp(α′, v) iff exp(f(α), v) ≤ exp(f(α′)).
Proof. 1. We have
∑
{α¯(e)v(e) : e ∈ E} =
1
T (α)
∑
{α¯(e)v(e) : e ∈ E} =
1
T (α)
exp(α, v).
2. We have T (τ ◦α) =
∑
{hα(e) : e ∈ E} = h
∑
{α(e) : e ∈ E} = hT (α). So
exp(τ ◦ α, v) = exp(τ ◦ α, v) =
1
T (τ ◦ α)
exp(τ ◦ α, v) =
1
hT (α)
h exp(α, v)
=
1
T (α)
exp(α, v) = exp(α¯, v).
3. Trivial.
If we take in account the abstract form of Allais Paradox, we have
exp(α′, v) < exp(α′, v) iff
1
T (α′)
exp(α′, v) <
1
T (α)
exp(α, v)
iff
1
x+ y
(y · 0.1 + x · 0.89) <
1
3
iff 2.3857x < y,
while on the other side we have always exp(β, v) < exp(β′, v).
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